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Abstract
Banks control valuable private information about borrowers. A nonmonetary cost of bank
failure may be that this information is lost (Bernanke 1983). This paper develops a
dynamic search model of banking to examine the regulatory implications of this view.
Official assistance prevents the destruction of informational capital as it allows banks to
continue their operations. However, assistance may undermine market discipline if banks
anticipate being bailed out. An optimal policy of 'constructive ambiguity' (Corrigan 1990)
is hence derived, in which official assistance reduces the real cost associated with bank
failure, taking into account the negative incentive effects of government interventíon.
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necessarily those of ABN AMRO Bank.Financial Intermediation, Bank Failure and Ofticial Assistance
The issue of government assistance to problem banks remains all too relevant. Recently,
difficulties in the banking industry have involved bail-outs in a number of countries. In
the United States the troubled savings and loans sector has absorbed large amounts of
taxpayers' money. Bail-outs have occurred in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Australia and
Spain, as well (see OECD (1992)). The scale of government assistance in the
Scandinavian countries has become so large that the Nederlandsche Bank (1993)
characterizes the resulting situation as de facto nationalization, enforced by circumstances,
of a significant part of the banking system.
This paper focuses on the informational capital that is destroyed when a bank fails. In
a seminal paper, Bernanke (1983) argues that the loss of banks' accumulated expertise,
information and customer relationships involved with financial collapse raised the cost of
credit intetmediation during the Great Depression. This may have had a significant
nonmonetary effect on the macro economy, in addition to the monetary effects of banking
panics. Recent microeconomic papers support the hypothesis that bank failure may
involve informational costs. Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993; SSP hereafter) present
empirical evidence that bank t'inancial distress harms client firms as a result of their loss
of relationship-based cost advantages intrinsic to bank lending.' James (1991) finds that
significant going-concern value is lost if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) liquidates a failed bank, because no well-developed secondary market for the
bank's assets exists due to information asyrnmetries between the bank and other market
participants concerning the quality of the assets. Bernanke (1993), Petersen and Rajan
(1994) and SSP suggest that the infotmational cost involved with bank failure may have
implications for banking supervision. Theoretical support for this conjecture seems
important.
This paper studies the public policy implication of the view that information capital is
lost in case of bank failure. It analyzes a trade-off between the informational cost of bank
failure and the moral hazard problems involved with anticipated assistance. I propose a
two-period search model of banking. According to Bernanke (1983), the real service
performed by the banking system is [he differentiation between good and bad borrowers.
The cost of credit intermediation, defined as the cost of chattneling funds from depositors
into the hands of high-quality borrowers, includes screening, monitoring and accounting2
costs. "Banks presumably choose operating procedures that minimize the cost of credit
intermediation. This is done by (a) developing expertise at evaluating potential borrowers;
(b) establishing long-tetm relationships with customers; and (c) offering loan conditions
that encourage potential borrowers to self-select in a favorable way. "Z In my model,
presumption (a) is reflected in the banks' search technology. At a cost banks are able to
search for an investment project and monitor its quality. Search effort is unobservable for
outsiders and is therefore non-contractible. Only the searching bank observes the quality
of a monitored project. In case of bank intermediation only the investing bank costlessly
observes the project's return realization. The latter informational assumption ensures that
a standard debt contract (in this case a fixed-repayment deposit contract) is optimal (see
Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985)).
If a bank has identified a high-quality project in period 1, it may in the second period
reinvest in the same project at zero search cost. Information is reusable (see Chan et al.
(1986)), so the bank can minimize the cost of financial intermediation by establishing
long-term relationships with good borrowers. This reflects Bernanke's presumption (b).
Berger and Udell (1994) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) present empirical evidence that
bank-firm relationships reduce the cost of financial intermediation.
The model is related to Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992). The main differences are the
following. First, Shatpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) focus on the effect of bank infotmation
on the bank-borrower relation, whereas I am interested in bank regulation.' Second, I
assume that banks have to compete for deposits before [hey are able to make loans.
Including a deposit market in the model is important because banking supervision seems
to be concerned particularly with the liability side of bank balance sheets.' In Rajan
(1992) the deposit market is not explicitly defined, whereas in Sharpe (1990) it is
uncompetitive. Third, in my paper an important agency problem between a depositor and
its bank concerns the bank's incentive not to invest search effort. This may induce
excessively risky investments, as in the one-period model of Bester (1994) S In Sharpe
(1990) and Rajan (1992) this agency problem is absent.
In my model government intervention may be useful. In practice, rcgulators control
exit (and entry) for the banking industry, just as bankruptcy courts control exit in most
other industries. For example, in the US the state bank chartering agency, or the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of national banks, is responsible for3
declaring a bank insolvent (see e.g. James ( 1991)). The model provides a clear rationale
for this, even under the assumption that the government agency's information is no better
than that of the bank's depositor. Suppose that the government (or some independent
agency) would not interfere with financially distressed banks, and suppose that some bank
B would report default to its depositor. Then the depositor would value this bank at its
liquidation value. Other banks might value bank B higher if they could take over this
bank as a going concern -- for example, because some of bank B's private infotittation
might then be retained. The depositor would therefore not liquidate bank B, but would
inform other banks that bank B had reported default. Competition between these banks
would enable the depositor to demand the value of bank B as a going concern, in
exchange for foregoing his own right to liquidate the bank. Consequently bank B would
always escape liquidation; the incentive effect of liquidation would thus disappear due to
the depositors' inability to commit to exercising the liquidation option in case of default.
As a result, market discipline would suffer (banks would not search for good investments,
for instance), and so would social welfare. Therefore the government may increase
welfare by preventing uncontrolled private-market bank rescues that would undermine the
threat, and [hus the incentive effect, of liquidation. So in this paper the private sector is
not tough enough. This contrasts with other strands of the literature where government
intervention may be needed because private markets are too tough.b
As an alternative to liquidation, the government agency may engage in assisting the
troubled bank. In practice, assistance may take one of two forms (see e.g. James (1991)
and SSP): (a) providing open bank assistance and taking direct contml of bank
management and operations, or (b) arranging for the purchase or merger of the troubled
institution with another bank. Assistance involves some transaction cost. The model may
explain why assistance can be a useful alternative to liquidation. If a bank has identified a
good investment project in period 1 and this project fails due to bad luck, a positive effect
of government assistance may be that some socially valuable information about the good
investment is maintained by keeping the bank alive. The information would be lost if the
authorities would allow the bank to fail.' The model indicates that a mixed strategy with
regard to assistance may be optimal, as it may improve welfare and at the same time
prevent the moral hazard problems. This is in accordance with Corrigan's (1990)
statement before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Public Affairs that4
with regard to intervention the authorities should maintain a policy of 'constructive
ambiguity' about whether assistance should be made available to banks in trouble. It is
also in line with the observation by the IMF (1991, p.47) that "... the authorities in all
major industrial countries have been purposely vague about when (if ever) assistance
would be made available to large institutions."
The implications of the 'inside debt' no[ion for banking supervision may be relevant
for the dispute over whether central banks should in addition to their narrowly defined
monetary tasks also protect lending and other functions of banks. According to Bernanke
(1993), this dispute turns on whether major problems in the banking system would be
disruptive to the economy for reasons over and alxwe any effects they had on the money
supply. This may be the case if banks possess valuable non-transferable private
information about borrowers. In practice the responsibility of the monetary authorities
seems to extend beyond the narrowly defined tasks of controlling the growth rates of the
monetary aggregates or influencing the level and structure of interest rates. Brimmer
(1989), for example, notes that in addition to these tasks, the Federal Reserve System
"has a major responsibility in the containment of those rypes of risks which threaten to
disrupt [he fabric of the financial system which is so vital to the economy at large" (see
also Muller (1990)). SSP go one step further by noting that "the government's willingness
to support a bank rather than allow its liquidation is a public policy judgement that
liquidation leads to significant losses in social welfare because gains associated with
accrual of private information by screening and monitoring, and the development of
borrower reputation associated with continuous relations, are bank specific and
nonsalvageable."
Section I sets out the basic model. The second period is studied in section II. Section
III analyzes the two-period model under the assumption that banks that report default are
always liquidated. Section IV studies the government's decision about whether to provide
assistance. Section V discusses the assumptions of the model and some possible
extensions. Section VI concludes.
I. The model
The model features a two-period economy in which all economic agents are risk-neutral.5
A. Investment projects
An infinite number of investment projects are available.e A project may last for two
periods if it is not liquidated in period 1. There are two types of projects. A fraction q, 0
G q G 1, is of the low-risk or good type, with success probability pg. Fraction I-q is of
the high-risk or bad type, with success probability p,, C pg. In each period projects yield
return X in case of success and zero in case of failure. Return realizations in both periods
are independent and the success probability of each project is constant over time.9
Assume pbX 1 1. Each project requires an investment of size 1 per period. Funds are
scarce in both periods, and are possessed by the depositors.
B. Depositors
Depositors exist for one period only. Each period features a finite number (M) of
depositors, each possessing one unit of capital, who are unable to observe the quality of
an investment project. With regard to the investment decision, they face two options. The
first is to invest directly in a project with unobserved quality. In this case the expected
probability of success equals p~ qps f(1-q)pb, and the depositor costlessly observes the
return realization of the project. The alternative option is to deposit funds with banks.
Any returns on investment are consumed immediately.
C. Banks
There is Bertrand-competition for deposits among banks. Banks have the specific ability
to search for and judge investment projects. By investing a positive effort cost c(the
"search cost"), the bank privately observes whether an investment project is of the good
or bad type. Once the bank has invested search effort, it encounters no informatíon
problems on the asset side of its balance sheet. Outsiders cannot verify whether the bank
searches or not. A bank may inves[ in a project using one unit of funds from a depositor.
The bank invests in one project, financed by one depositor. This prevents a coordination
problem between depositors; thus a bank run will not emerge in equilibrium. In order to
attract funds, the bank offers some deposit rate r z I. When the bank finances a project,
the depositor cannot directly observe the outcome of the project. Banks may therefore
cheat about the return realization of [he project. If a bank reports default, the depositor
requires the government to liquidate the bank. This acts as a repayment ittcentive for the6
bank. In case of liquidation, the depositor receives the liquidation revenue. Banks may
operate during two periods, unless they are liquidated in period 1.
Assumption 1: The search cost c is such that in period 1 depositors prefer bank finance
to direct investment.
Section III derives tlte critical value c, and restates this assumption as c 5 c,.
D. Sequence of events
1. In pgriod 1 banks offer gross deposit rates r,. M banks manage to become active, that
is, to attract one unit of deposits each. Banks may search for good investment projects
or invest the depositor's funds at random.
2. If the project succeeds, the bank has two options. The bank may act honestly and
repay its depositors the promised amount of r,. Alternatively, since the project return
is unobservable to the depositor the bank may cheat and falsely claim project failure.
Any profit generated in period 1 is consumed by the bank owner.
3. If the financed project fails, the bank cannot repay its depositor and must report
default. 1'he depositor reports this to the government.'o In this case there are two
possibilities. The first is that the bank's remaining assets are liquidated. T'his is a
standard incentive scheme, which induces the bank to repay if successful. In case of
liquidation the bank's active period ends. Alternatively, the government assists the
bank. Assistance implies that the bank is kept alive and is able to reinvest in period 2.
An exact description of government policy is given in section IV.
4. In period 2, NZ 5 M banks invested in period 1 and were not liquidated (because they
repaid their depositors or because they were assisted by the govemment). Refer to
these banks as "reinvesting banks." Depositors are able to distinguish reinvesting banks
from new banks. Reinvesting banks have an informational advantage, and compete
only with new banks. Reinvesting banks will attract deposits and simply reinvest into
the good project they discovered in the first period without incurring the search cost
again. M- NZ second-period depositors may either invest their funds with new banks,
or may finance a project directly without observing its quality. Contrary to reinvesting
banks, new banks have not acquired private information about projects in period 1.
5. At the end of period two the economy ends. Banks that did not repay are liquidated.II. Equilibrium in the second period
The interesting cau: is when all active banks have invested search eFfort in the first
period. These banks may reuse their information in period 2, which produces an
informational rent. This section derives the equilibrium of the period 2 subgame, given
that all active banks have searched in period 1. Banks that do not repay depositors are
liquidated at the end of period 2. This prevents cheating about the project return by
successful banks, since honest behavior will be shown to yield positive protïts.
A. New banks
Consider a depositor that has two options: either invest with a new bank, or invest by
himself, at random. If new banks do not search for good projects, depositors would rather
invest the funds by themselves. Depositors cannot observe a bank's search behavior, so
they must be sure that the bank has the incentive to search in case of bank intermediation.
The bank has this incentive if its profit in case of search is sufficiently high, so if ffie
deposit rate is sufficiently low:
Lemma 1: In period 2, searching is optimalfor new banks ijj`
rzs sz-X - c (1)
9(Pg-F~
Proof: As there are infinitely many projects, after each round of searching the decision
whether or not to search is the same. In case of search the new bank iJentifies a good
project in the first round with probability q, incurring search cost c 1 0; otherwise it
searches again. The bank's expected profit in period 2, given repayment obligation rZ, is
VN(C2) - qpi(X-r~ - C f (1-q)VN(r2)
so VN(rz) - pe(X-rz) - c!q (Z)
The hank earns ~(X-r:) in period 2 when investing at random. Searching is optimal for
new banks iff VN(rZ) z p(X-rz), so iff (1) holds. Q.E.D.
Intet~nediation by new banks takes place only if (1) is satisfied.
B. Period 2 equilibrium
Reinvesting banks exploit their informational advantage. This implies that if new banks8
are active and search for good projects, reinvesting banks offer the same deposit rate as
new banks but earn a profit that is higher by the saved search cost clq. If depositors
prefer direct investment tu investment through new banks, reinvesting banks charge the
rate that makes depositors indifferent between direct investment and the reinvesting bank.
Competition for deposits determines the equilibrium deposit rate. If intermediation by
new banks takes place, competition for deposits drives up r, until (1) is binding. Given r;,
depositors earn pgr2 when depositing with a reinvesting bank or a new bank. If depositors
invest their funds directly into projects picked at rartdom, the depositor's expected return
equals pX. So period 2 depositors prefer searching new banks to direct investment iff
Pe i'z z BX ,
i.e. iff c 5 c2 ~ q(pBp)ZXlpg (3)
In that case new banks earn strictly positive profits in period 2 by (1), (2) and c~ 0.
Reinvesting banks' profits, given by
VR(rz) - Pe(X-r2) , (4)
are even higher. We have proven the following:
Proposition 1: Assume that all active banks invest in good projects in period 1. Then the
equilibriiun ofthe period 2 suhgume can he characterizedasfollows:
a) !f c ~ e2, in period 2 both reinvesting banks and new banks are active asfinaneial
intermediaries. A[l banks offer the same deposit rate iz- ~2 . All active banks make
positive profits, but reinvesting banks' profits are higher by c~q.
b) If c 1 cZ, in period 2 only reinvesting bank.s act asfinancial intermediaries. They o,~`er
gross deposit rate r'Z - QXIpR and make positive proftts. New banks are inactive.
At the start of period 2, reinvesting banks have an informational advantage about an
investment project. This creates some monopoly power vis-à-vis period 2 depositors,
which allows reinvesting banks to earn positive profits in period 2. This is a standard
result, see e.g. Sharpe (1990)." New banks also earn a strictly positive profit if they are
active in period 2, despite competition for deposits. This is because the banks' search
effort is non-verifiable to outsiders and therefore non-contractible. As in Bester (1994),
new banks search only if searching is profitable -- so if deposit rates are not too high. If
search effort were contractible, the deposit contract could oblige the bank to search.
Competition for deposits would then leave only zero expected profit for the bank.9
III. Period one, no official assistance
In this section I assume that if the bank reports default, it is liquidated. That is, the
government dces not provide assistance to any bank. In turn the successful bank will not
cheat about the project outcome. Depositors may prefer bank intermediation only if banks
search for a good project; else, depositors would rather invest by themselves.
A. Period one equilibrium
Proposition 2: In the absence of government assistance there is a critica[ search cost c,
1 cZ such that in period 1 banks search for good projects iff c 5 c,. The equilibrium
deposit rate is r,' - r~ ~ ~2 . All active banks earn positive expected profits over nvo
periods.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 2's proof follows much the same lines as the proof of proposition 1. It
derives the bank's two-period payoff from searching and from investing at random, and
detetmine for which values of r, the former exceeds the latter. This is the search
condition, analogous to (1). Given the search condition, the proof derives a condition in
tetms of c such that depositors prefer searching banks to random investment, like (3).
Some fraction of the bank's expected period 2 reinvestment profit is competed away in
period 1. Still, as search effort is non-contractible, banks search only if it is profitable for
them. Therefore the active banks' overall profits are strictly positive. This result differs
from Sharpe ( 1990), where banks earn zero profit over two periods. The reason is that in
Sharpe's model banks are unable to search, so there is no need to induce them to search.
Von Thadden ( 1991) concludes that a financial system that manages to solve the
monitoring problem well may have an advantage in financing long-term investment (see
also Mayer (1988)).'2 The results here point in the same direction. If the search cost is
not too high (c 5 c,), banks solve an adverse selection problem on behalf of the
depositors. The high-quality investment projects they select have a relatively high
probability of profitable reinvestment. If banks would be inefficient (c 1 q), depositors
would invest their funds at random in a project with unobserved quality, with a lower
probability of reinvestment. So efficient financial intetmediaries increase the probability
that profitable long-tenn financing occurs." This insight may help to understand alo
problem faced by the previously communist countries. Calvo attd Frenkel (1991) observe
that the complex system of infotmation necessary to assess risk and credit-worthiness is
underdeveloped in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, for there were no incentives to
accumulate such information under the communist regimes. They note that the difficulties
in assessing credit-worthiness of individual enterprises in these countries could result in
an equilibrium in which socially profitable long-term projects may be postponed while
less profitable short-ternt investments are uttdertaken.
Proposition 2 makes it possible to res[ate assumption 1(see section I) as follows:
Assumption 1: c 5 cl.
B. The social cost of early liquidation
Section IV examines official assistattce as a means to reduce the welfare loss of
liquidation of a bank at the end of period 1("eazly liquidation"). If a bank has identified a
good project in period 1 and is not liquidated, in period 2 it may simply reinvest in the
same project without incurring the search cost again. Eazly liquidation of the bank
precludes this socially desirable reinvestment opportunity. By liquidating a bank in period
1, the depositor imposes a negative externality on the agents that are active in period 2.
To determine the cost of early liquidation, note that reinvestment in the good project
generates the amount pgX of social welfare in period 2. By proposition 1, new banks are
active in the second period if the search cost satisfies c 5 cZ. A new bank generates
p~X - clq of social welfare in period 2. In this case the loss of welfare as a result of early
liquidation equals clq. If c 1 c2, period 2 depositors prefer direct investment. Welfare in
case of direct investment equals pX. The difference in welfare compared to a project
financed by a reinvesting bank is equal to (pg~)X. This provides the following result:
Proposition 3: Assume that all bunks invest in goal projects in period I. Then the social
cost L of liquidating a bank at the end ofperiod 1 can be characterized asfollows:
a) if c 5 c2, the cost of early liquidation equals L- cIq ;
b) if c~ c,, the cost ofearly líquidation equals L-(papJX.
This proposition states the real cost involved with bank failure. The cost is incteasing in
c, so the reinvestment option is more valuable for higher search cost. Govetnment
assistance may reduce this cost of early liquidation.11
IV. Period 1, government assistance
This section studies the game when the government may choose to assist banks in trouble.
The govemment aims at maximizing social welfare (i.e. the sum of payoffs of all banks
and depositors over two periods minus the cost of assistance), subject to the conditions
that banks search and do not cheat in equilibrium. It can be shown that highest welfare is
indeed obtained if banks search and do not cheat, unless the transaction cost of
government assistance is very low. All agents know the govetnment's objective function.
The order of moves is as follows.
1. At the beginning of period 1 the government commits to a combination of parameters
(p„ Y(p)), where ~ is the probability that the govemment bails out a bank that reports
default in period 1 and Y(p) is [he amount paid [o the depositor in caee of a bailout.
The assumption that the government is able to commit to ~ G 1 will be discussed
below. Y(p) is such that depositors are indifferent between liquidation of the bank and
accepting the transfer offered by the govemment. In equilibrium the govemment picks
the welfare-maximizing combination (ii,Y(p,~).
2. Banks compete for deposits, may or may not search for good projects, invest
depositors' funds and privately observe the returns of their projects.
3. Banks report success (followed by repayment) or default (followed by liquidation or
assistance). In case of assistance, the govemment compensates depositors to keep them
from exercising the liquidation option. This enables the assisted banks in the second
period to reinvest in the same project as in period 1.
Since the economy ends at the end of period 2, the government plays no intervention role
in that period.
In addition, asswue:" ~:~1 'I'he guvernment dcxa not observe the actual outcome of the
project. Assistance may thus adversely affect the banks' incentive to repay depositors in
case of success. (b) The government dces not observe an individual bank's seareh
behavior. Assistance may have an effect on the banks' incentive to search. (c) The direct
cost of official assistance is equal to aY(p). There are different interpretations for this
cost, depending on who pays for the bailout. Taxpayers may be charged for it; in that
case direct cost of assistance may be interpreted as the cost of distortionary taxation.
Distortionary taxation inflicts disutility ~(1 fa) on [axpayers in order to levy ~1 for the12
state. Alternatively if government assistance takes the form of, say, helping to arrange the
takeover of the defaulting bank by another bank, one can think of aY(p,) as consisting of
the administrative cost of the takeover, the cost of determining the value of the defaulting
bank's assets, et cetera.
To determine this direct cost of assistance, note that Y(~) depends on the bank's
behavior (search or not search, cheat or not cheat). The bank's behavior will be shown to
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If ~ is such that case A or case C behavior emerge, banks report default only if the
project really failed. In that case the expected liquidation revenue to depositors is zero
and so is the direct cost of assistance aY(~). In case B, the depositor's expected revenue
from liquidating the bank, given that it has reported default, equals pgX, so Y(k) - pgX
and aY(p) - apgX. Similarly, aY(p) - a~X in case D.
The direct beneftt of assistance consists of the saved cost of early liquidation. If banks
search and do not cheat, for given p the saved cost of early liquidation equals pL, with L
given by proposition 3.
This presenta[ion helps to motivate the assumption that the government is able to
commit to k. Assume that if the government picks ~. - 1 1 ti once, it loses the
reputatiun that it induces banks to display type A behavior.15 Givcn that a bank has
searched and dces not cheat (type A behavior), [he extra welfare from picking ~- 1
equals (1-~')L. If as a result K other banks find out about the government's softness,
these banks will be tempted to cheat andlor not to invest search effort. On balance this
involves a significant welfare loss unless K is very small (see also the payoffs (5)-(8)).
A. Incentive effects of assistance
The government's objective that banks search and do not cheat in equilibrium, implies
that the government picks p such that the bank displays type A behavior (see the table).
The bank dces not cheat if its payoffs in cases A and C exceed those in cases B and D.13
To state the next lemma, define
e~(t~) ~ (1-~)[x f va(r2')1
and 62(~) ~(1-~)[X t VB(r2)] G 6,(~)
Lemma 2: Assume that if a bank reports default, the government assists with probability
p. Given that the bank has privately observed project success in period !, its repayment
hehavior can be characterized as fo[lows:
(a) !f the bank has searched, it repays the depositor if r, 5 6,(P) : otherwise, if r, 1
6f(te), the bank cheats about the project return and reports project failure.
(b) !f the bank has invested at random, it repays the depositor if r, 5 Az(P) ;
otherwise, if r! ~ 6Z(~), the bank cheats about the project return and reports
project fai[ure.
Proof: Consider W(r,,r2) and Wo(r„r~ as defined in the proof of Proposition 2. In cases
A, B, C and D the bank's expected profit over two periods, given ~, equals, respectively,
A(r„rZ) - W(r,,r~ t (1-pi)PVa(r2) (5)
B(rl,r~ - P`ILIX f VR(r3)~ f(1-P~IAVR(r~ - clCl (6)
C(rl.r2) - WO(ri,r2) } ( 1-~1~~(X"CL (7)
and1ó D(r~,rx) - PJiIXfVe(ra)] t (1-p)w)2(X-r2) (g)
Statement (a) simply follows from the fact that A(r„r2~ z B(r,,r2') iff r, 5 6,(~).
Statement (b) follows from the fact that C(r,,r2) 5 D(r,,rZ') iff r, 5 AZ(~.). Q.E.D.
If the project succeeds, the randomly investing bank may have a higher incentive to cheat
about the project return than the bank that has searched, as 6Z(~) G 9,(~). The reason
can be found in the randomly investing batilc's lower success probability. Given that
default is reported, the randomly investing bank's (ex pos[) probability that the project
really failed is relatively high. '1'his increases the itx:entive to shirk.
To see the effect of assistartce on search effort, assume tttat banks do not cheat. For a
given value of r„ government assistance increases the payoff of a bank that searches by
(1-pg)~VR(r2) (see (5)). It increases the payoff of a randomly investing bank by (1-pJ~p(X-
rZ), see (7). A comparison of the two expressions yields
Lemma 3: Asswne tltat ij a hank reports default, the government assists with probability
~. Assistance decreases the hank s incentive to search in perlod 1 if
Pa(1-p~l c L'(!PJ (9)la
Randomly investing banks have a higher probability of receiving assistance than do banks
that search for good projects, for two t~easoas. The projects of randomly investing banks
are more likely to fail, and in case of success these banks may have a higher incentive to
cheat. So government assistance may yield unfavorable incentive effects. However, the ex
post benefit of assistattce is higher for banks that have searched.
B. Constraints on government assistance
Three types of constraints occw in the government's welfare maximization problem. The
first type consists of the incentive constraints. The government wants banks to search and
not to cheat. For given r, this is attained if A(r,,ri) is the highest bank payoff. Define





Note that if (9) holds, 63(~.) and 0.(~) are decreasing in P.
I,etnma 4: Assume that if a bank reports default, the government assists with probability
p. Banks search anddo not cheat in period 1 i,~`r, 5 6,(~), r, 5 9i(~) and r, 5 6~(~).
Proof: One has A(r,,r2') z B(r,,r2) iff r, 5 6,(~); A(r,,rZ) z C(r,,r2') iff r, 5 A3(~);
and A(r„rZ') z D(r,,r2') iff r, 5 A,(~). Q.E.D.
As the government wants banks to search and not to cheat, the deposit rate r, should
satisfy the restrictions of lemma 4: r, 5 6;(~), i- 1,3,4. Otte problem is, however, that
competition for deposits in period 1 dces not automatically lead to an equilibrium deposit
rate r, that satisfies these restrictions. If banks would search for good projects and cheat
about the project revenue in case of success (type B behavior), the depositor's expected
payoff would be equal to its maximum value Y(p) - prX. Competition for deposits may
result in an equilibrium in which only the banks that would follow the adverse type B
policy would attract deposits. Refer to this as the type B equilibrium. In this equilibrium
banks and depositors would exploit the taxpayers, because the cheating bank would still
be assisted with probability p. This involves high costs of distortionary taxation. The
government wants to prevent the type B equilibrium. Of course if the government could
regulate deposit rates, the type B equilibrium could be ruled out easily. The governmentls
could set a deposit rate ceiling such that the restrictions of lemma 4 would be satisfied: r,
5 6;(p), i- 1,3,4. I assume, however, that the government cannot regulate deposit
rates. In that case the type B equilibrium can be ruled out by imposing an upper bound on
p, to discourage banks to display type B behavior. To state the ttext lemma, define
pA - cl9 (10)
[paR-R(R~R)1(X-rZ) } (pa pJX
and pe - VR(rz)I[xfVa(rz)]
Lemma 5: Assume that if a bank reports default, the government assists with probability
p. If p 5 p, ~ Max[p,,, PgJ, banks will not offer deposit rates that violate the conditions
of lemma 4.
Proof: See Appendix.
If p 5 p, is binding in equilibrium, a deposit ra[e ceiling could increase welfare. In case
of a deposit rate ceiling, the assistance probability p could be higher than in the absence
of deposit rate regulation.
The third constraint to the welfare maxirnization problem is the bank activity consiraint
p~r, Z px (11)
Government assistance may favor cheating and random investment by banks. To
counterbalance this effect, the deposit rate that induces banks to search and not to cheat,
may be decreasing in W. It should not decrease so much that de~ositors strictly prefer
direct investment to bank intermediation. Therefore condition (11) may be binding.
C. The optimal intervention policy
The government maximizes welfare by maximizing P, subject to the conditions in
lemma's 3 and 4 and to condition (11). To state the following result, define
W -
(pa-Q)Pt `QVa(rz )





Proposition 4: Assume that i1 is optimal that banks search and do not cheat about the
project return. Then there is a critical search cost c,, 1 cz such that the optimal16 '
probabiliry p' of government assistance to banks that have reported default is given by:
a) !f c 5 c,,, ti - p, with 0 G p, G 1.
b) !f c,, G c S c,, ti - Min[p2, p~ with 0 5 Min[pZ, pjJ G~,.
The equilibrium deposit rate is r,' - A,(p') if c 5 c,,. If c~ G c S c„ one has r,'
QX~Pg-
Proof: see Appendix.
The government is not interested in the distribution of welfare between banks and
depositors as determined by the deposit rate. It picks the highest p such that banks search
and do not cheat and such that depositors prefer bank intermediation to direct finance.
Governtnent assistance may undermine the bank's incentive to search. In that case the
equilibrium deposit rate in case of assistance is lower than in the absence of assistance.
One could refer to this as "implicit deposit rate regulation." Although assistance increases
welfare, period 1 depositors may be worse off as a result of possible unfavorable
incentive effects of intervention.
Figure 1 draws the optimal assistance probability li as a function of the search cost c,
given that (9) holds." The shape of the curve can be understood as follows. If the
search cost c is not too large (c S c,~, banks search even if the deposit rate is relatively
high. Competition for deposits ensures titat depositors strictly prefer bank intermediation
over direct investment. The deposit rate that prevents the moral hazard problems of
assistance is decreasing in the search cost c. As can be verified, the bank's overall pmfit
increases with the search cost c. Therefore moral hazard problems decrease in c. This
enables the government to pick a higher assistance probability: fi is increasing in c 5 cA.
If the search cost c rises above the critical value c~, the deposit rate has decreased so
much that depositors no longer strictly prefer bank intermediation. To prevent the deposit
rate becoming too low for bank intermediation, the government has to reduce the moral
hazard problems of assistance. It dces so by lowering the assistattce probability p' as a
function of the search cost c.
--- INSERT FIGURE 1 ---
With regard to official assistatxe, therefore, the authorities adopt a mixed strategy. This








time reduces the social cost of failures of financial institutions. Banks can never be certain
about the action that the government will take. This is in line with Corcigan's (1990,
p.14) view that ".. market discipline will be better served in a context in which the
authorities maintain a policy of what I would like to call 'constructive ambiguity' as to
what they will do .. ". It also gives some theoretical background to the observation by the
International Monetary Fund {1991, p. 47) that "the authorities in all major countries
have been purposely vague about when (if ever) assistance would be made available to
large institutions .. "18
V. Model Robustness and Generalizations
This section discusses some assumptions and suggests possible extensions of the model.
A. The siZe of banks
If projects are not perfectly correlated, the pmbability that the bank cannot fulfill its
obligations to depositors decreases in the number of projects in which it invests (see
Diamond (1984)). This model, for simplicity, assumes that a bank attracts only one unit
of funds and invests this in one project. However, as long as the probability of default is
positive also for well-diversified banks, governments may still have to decide about
whether official assistance should be made available. Boyd and Runkle (1993) present
empirical evidence showing that the risk of default for large banks is not necessarily
smaller than the risk of default for small banks. Moreover, the probability that a large
bank facing problems receives assistance may be higher than a small bank facing
problems, because the large bank's information value may well be higher.
An extended model could allow banks to attract funds from many depositors, and
invest these in many projects. If the coordination problems between depositors are
solved,'~ it would be interesting to have a model of optimal bank siu that would ncit
feature a natural monopoly of a perfectly diversified, almost risk-free bank. Delegation
costs due to incentive problems wi hi the bank may provide a limit to the optimal size of
a bank. If the incentive problems between, for instance, the bank principal and the loan
officers increase with bank size, the optimal bank size may be smaller than the natural
monopoly outcome. This is an important topic for future research.Is
B. The government's information: concentrated versus dispersed banking systems
In the model the government's information is very limited. Suppose that the government
would be able [o observe some signal S imperfectly correlated with an individual bank's
search effort, in line with "the supervisor's role to assure himself that (bank) management
is competent, has proper controls, procedures and standards in place" (see Muller
(1990)). In that case a bank that has searched and reports default would receive assistance
with a higher probability than would a bank that has not searched. Consequently,
government assistance might have a positive incentive effect on the bank's search
behavior. If this positive effect would not be outweighed by a nega[ive effect on the
bank's incentive to cheat, the extra infotmation could allow the government to be
somewhat more lenient. Suppose that it is easier for the government to obtain information
about bank behavior in concentrated banking systems (like those in many European
countries) than in widely dispersed banking systems (like in the US). In that case
supervisors in concentrated banking systens might allow themselves to rescue banks with
somewhat higher probability than in dispersed banking systems.~
C. Alternative ways to reduce the moral hazardproblems
Bank capital might reduce the banks' moral hazard problems involved with government
intervention. Alternatively, the government could oblige assisted banks to make a
payment to the government in case of success in period 2. A second-period tax T could
be introduced for banks that have received assistance in period 1 and are subsequently
successful in period 2. T could involve a cost of tax collection. The expected second-
period tax equals pgT for banks that reinvest in a high-quality project. One must have pgT
5 cly, hecause otherwise second-period depositors would prefer new searching banks
instead of assisted banks Facing a tax burden. T would negatively affect the bank's
second-period incentives to repay in case of success. On the other hand T may have a
favorable intluence on the bank's period 1 incentives, as the profit from cheating is
lowered. Inclusion of T would change some of the calculations but not the qualitative
results. In practice, this kind of [axation occuts if official assistance implies
nationalization of the bank, in which case future dividend payments from the bank to the
government can be considered as repayment by the bank.19
D. The bank-borrower relatron
Bester (1994), Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) show that bank intermediation may alter
the share of the total project revenue that the entrepreneur is able to acquire. This paper
dces not go into such distribution problems. The bank acquires the entire project revenue,
as there are infmitely many entrepreneurs. The model may easily be extended with a
framework that allows bargaining between bank and botrower, as in Bester (1994).
VI. Conclusion
Banks may possess valuable private, non-transferable information about botmwers. This
paper argues that government intervention may be useful if bank failure implies that this
information is lost. Depositors delegate the task of controlling bank liyuidation to the
government. If the (information) value of the bank as a going concern would be higher
than the liquidation value, private parties would not liquidate a bank that reports default
but sell it as a going concern. This might undermine the threat, and thus the incentive
effect, of bank liquidation. Government intervention should ensure that banks which
report default do not always escape liquidation. In addition, government intervention may
involve assistance to banks in trouble. The paper studies the trade-off between the
informational benefït of assistance (preserving a bank's valuable private infotmation) and
the negative effect that anticipated assistance may have on market discipline. The tasks
performed by the government could also be perfotmed by some independent agency,
except for that of raising taxes to bail out banks.
Of course, the failure of a single bank affects only a narrow set of borrowers. Much of
the debate on the need for official safety nets has focused on the contagion or systemic
risk that the failure uf illiyuid or legally insolvent tïnancial institutions can create. Only
widesprr:td failures of tïnancial institutions would disrupt normal bank-borrower
relationships and cause a credit "squeeze" that would force non-financial tïrms to sharply
curtail their output and employment (see Betnanke (1983) and IMF (1991)). Avoiding the
real costs of a banking (or liquidity) crisis has been an important consideration in
formulating public policies. The exact magnitude of these costs is subject to dispute,
although the perception of policymakers is that they can be substantial. It would be
interesting to extend the model with Pazoush's (1988) assumption that the failure of anyzo
single bank would entail a chain reaction. The inclusion of interdependencies among
banks could provide the link between the microeconomic theory of this model and
possible macrceconomic implications for banking supervision. The extended model might
help to explain why the responsibility of the monetary authorities seems to extend beyond
the narrowly defined monetary tasks of controlling the growth rates of the monetary
aggregates or influencing the level and structure of interest rates, to include the
containment of those types of risks which threaten to disrupt the fabric of the fmancial
system (see Brimmer (1989)).
Appendix
Proof of pronosition 2: The organization of the proof is as follows. First, derive the
search condition analogous to (1). To do so, derive the bank's two-period payoff from
searching and from investing at random, and determine for which values of r, the former
exceeds the latter. Given the search condition, the condition is derived such that
depositors prefer searching banks to random investment, analogous to (3).
The bank's payoff from search: If the bank searches in period 1, success in period 1 leads
to reinvestment in period 2, generating the reinvestment profit VR(rz), see (4). The bank's
two-period profit, given r„ rz and the expected period 1 search cost clq (as in (2)), equals
W(rl,CZ) - pg~X - rl f VR(rz)J - CIq (12)
The bank's payo,(f from random invesrnte~ur Given r,, if the bank dces not search but
ins[ead invests a[ random in a project with unobserved quality, the bank's success
probability in period 1 is p. If the project succeeds, in period 2 the bank may reinvest in
[he same project. If the project is successful in period 1, the bank calculates the following
conditionnl prohability that Ihc prujcct is of the g~xxl type~: Q' ~ ypFlp ~ y. The period
2 success probability for this project is p' ~ Q'pBf(1-Q')pb, with g G p' C p~. So this
bank's expected period 2 profit in case of reinvestment equals
Vs(rz) - P~(7{-rz) (13)
The bank's expected payoff over two periods equals21
Wo(ri,rz) - PIX - r, f Ve(rz)~ (14)
Banks' search be{ravior in period 1: Let rz' be the period 2 equilibrium deposit rate given
that banks search in period l. An individual bank dces not deviate from the search path21
iff W(r,,r,') z W„(r„rZ'), see (12) and (14), so iff
r s ï i pay~r2)-QVB(r2) - P (15) i 2 p -Q i
a
Ano[her constraint on r, is the liquidity constraint r, S X. Since depositors live only for
a single period, period 1 depositors cannot receive more than the period 1 project revenue
X. A p`riod 1 deposit rate such that banks search for good projects must satisfy
r~ s Min[Pi;X] - i~ (16)
Period J eyuilibrium: If banks intermediate, competition I'or deposits makcs (16) binding.
If c 5 cz, period 1 depositors also prefer bank intermediation, as ii~rZ ; thus (16) is
binding. If c 1 cz, depositors prefer seazching banks to direct finance iff pgr,' Z pX. If
r,' - X, this holds trivially. If r,' G X, by (4), (13) and (15) one has pg pl z pX iff
c 5 c, . c~ f 9(PBP~(P~Z-PP')Xlpg (17)
If c- c,, r,' - QXlpe G X. So c 5 c, is necessary and sufficient for a search
equilibrium to arise. By r,' S X we have Wo(r,',rZ') 1 0. In combination with W(r,,rZ')
z Wo(r,,r2), see (15), this proves that searching banks earn positive expected profits that
rise in c. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Distinguish two cases. (i) If the bank searches and dces not cheat if r,
- X, the depositor earns pBX and dces not prefer the type B equilibrium. The searching
bank dces not cheat iff A(X,rZ~ z B(X,rz7, so iff X 5 A,(k) or equivalently ~. S~B.
One has X- 6,(~,B) ~ AZ(~.B), so randomly investing banks cheat by lemma 2: C(X,r2')
G D(X,r2'). Given p-~B, the assumption that the bank searches for r, - X is satisfied
if A(X,rZ') Z D(X,r2'), i.e if X 5 6.(uB), which is equivalent to B(X,rZ') z D(X,rZ') by
X- 6,(Pw). The condition B(X.r,') ~ D(X,r2') is satisfied if c is small enough. So for c
small etwugh, X- 6,(~B) 5 6,(pB) G 6,(pe), and depositors earn the maximum payoff
pgX. (ii) For larger c, the condition X 5 6,(pB) is no longer satisfied. To induce banks
to search and no[ to cheat, r, G X. Depositors would prefer the type B equilibrium,
earning p~X. The type B equilibrium is ruled out if, given that banks cheat, it is not
profitable for them to search -- so if B(r,,rZ') 5 D(r,,r2'). This is equivalent to ~ 5~A.
Given that p 5 W~, banks do not search if the conditions of lemma 4 are violated. In that
case depositors would be better off without bank intetmediation.22
To show that ta„ 5 p~ iff X z 6.(~~, note that E),(~) ? A,(~) iff p 5~~. As O,(Ece) -
X, we have X z Ad(~e) iff ~B 5 u~. Q.E.D.
Proof of prooosition 4: The government maximizes tc subject to r; 5 9;(~.), i-1,3,4
(lemma 4); pgr, ~ pX, see (11); r, 5 X; and p 5 p, (lemma 5). By lemma 5, if c is
smalt enough, or.e has r, - X, u- p,B z}~,; and r; 5 9;(pa), i-1,3,4. The conditàor.
pBr, z EX is satisfied trivially. For e somewhat larger, P- Px 1 fee, and r, - 6,(~„)
- ey('.lA) G X, with A,(pA) G 63(P,~. The condition per, z pX is satisfied if c 5 c2, as
A,(~A) 1 pz . If c~ c2, per, z pX is equivalent to pr6,(~.,,J z pX, which holds iff
c s c - 4IíPa-AJXtPsyR(~x)~M~ (18)
A PsIXtVRír2 )l
with M~ the denominator of p,A, see (10). It can be seen easily that 0 G~, G 1.
b) If c~ cA, condition (I1) is not satisfied for p-~,. Distinguish two cases. (i) c~ 1
c,. This is the case if r, - 9~(p) increases in ta. Proposition 4a) applies for all c 5 c,.
(ii) cA G c 5 c,, so A4(~) is decreasing in P. Condition (11) is binding only if ~ G~,.
If c is only "slightly" greater than c~, c~ G c 5 some cB, we have r, - A4(p.) ~ AZ(P).
As A,(~) 5 A,(P) iff r, z 62(P), the condition r, 5 A,(p) is still not binding. The
binding constraints are r, 5 6~(p.) and (11). P solves pg6,(p) Z pX, so ~, -~ G p,,. If
c 1 cB, the condition 6,(~Z) ~ 62(~ is no longer satisfied, so r, 5 6,(~) G 6,(~) is
binding. p solves pg63({r) ? pX, so fc - Ey G PZ. The numerator of p3 is nonnegative by
c 5 c,. The denominator is nonnegative if cB G c 5 c,. The reason is that otherwise
63(p) would be increasing in ~, in which case cB would be greater than c,.
To determine r,', note that for c 5 c~, r, 5 6,(~,) is binding in combination with either
r, 5 X or r, 5 6,(~,). If c~ c,, pbr, - QX is binding. Q.E.D.23
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Footnotes
1. This can be explaincd by the view that bank loans are 'inside debt.' That is, bank loans
are different from publicly placed debt because banks know more about a company's
prospects than outside investors do. Banks have the capacity to provide cheap 'informed'
funds as opposed to costly 'uninformed' funds provided by outsiders (see e.g. Fama
(1985), James (1987), Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992)). SSP note that
information generated by a bank's loan officers consists of implicit as well as explicit
evaluations of corporate managers and associated lending commitments. Unlike more
concrete forms of data, this kind of infon~nation is difficult to transfer credibly.
2. Bernanke (1983, p.263). I do not consider debt contracts tha[ induce self-selection by
borrowers. See e.g. Bester (1985, 1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Milde and Riley
(1988) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
3. Also this motivates why I do not consider problems of determining the borrowing
firm's optimal capital structure. See e.g. Allen and Winton (1992) for a recent survey of
this literature.
4. This can be explained as follows. With regard to monetary supervision this is where
the money is. Moreover, in the policy-oriented literature it is often assumed that small
depositors are imperfectly informed about the bank's activities. Consequently, protecting
these depositors against mismanagement or fraud is considered to be an important
objective of bank supervision, see e.g. Kareken (1986) abe Muller (1990).
5. In Chan (1983) and Diamond (1991), the bank's searchlmonitoring effort is publicly
observable. They do not consider the moral hazard problem of the reliability of
information production, unlike Bester (1994) and this paper. As a result of this moral
hazard problem, banks may eam strictly positive profits despite competition for deposits,
because banks would not search if searehing would not be profitable for them.
6. One example is the bank-run literature (see e.g. Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Postlewaite and Vives (1988)). In this literature
govemment intervention may be useful because otherwise a coordination problem among
depositors might lead to liquidation of a solvent bank.
7. Failure of a single bank may also induce a domino-effect (see e.g. Paroush (1988)),
providing an extra motivation for official assistance. See section VI for a discussion.
8. In a survey among 1,828 Dutch companies performed by the Dutch central bank's
research department (de Haan et al. 1992, p.155), no less than 80.59b of the respondents
indicated that there is no scarcity of sufficiently profitable investment projects. The
assumption of infinitely many investment projects simplifies the analysis: if it is optimal
for the bank ta search for a Food pmject in round 1, [hen it is optimal to search in each
round.
9. Entrepreneurial talent may motivate the assumption why the borrower's type is
assumed to be constant over time. For simplicity I have not used a more general27
fotmulation like that found, for example, in Chan, Greenbaum aríd Thakor (1986), where
some fraction of borrowers change types from the first to the second period.
10. This assumption is motivated in the introductory section. If the resolution of fmancial
distress could take place without government intervention, default of a successful bank
would not be punished by liquidation. This would induce moral hazard problems, so the
depositor might not put his funds in a bank in the first place.
í 1. If projects woulá be financed in the first period by more than one bank, the
reinvesting banks' period 2 information monopoly would disappear. Bertrand competition
between banks would leave only zero reinvestment profit. However, the next section will
show that period 1 depositors are not hurt by the banks' period 2 monopoly power, but
instead profit from it. In combination with the search cost of financial intermediation, this
explains why my assumption that banks finance only one project may arise endogenously
in period 1. Sharpe's (1990) model has no transaction costs involved with borrowing and
lending. Therefore his assumption that in period 1 projects are financed by only one bank
could not arise endogenously.
12. In Von Thadden's model, the bank's information about the firm's type allows the firm
to choose a profitable long-run investment strategy that yields low returns initially instead
of a less profitable short-run strategy that getterates higher returns initially but lower
returns later on. As the bank knows the fuin's type, the fum dces not run the risk of
being liquidated just because initial returns are low, for the bank knows that ultimately
returns will be high. Therefore bank finance facilitates long-term investment strategies.
13. A reverse relation may also hold. If c2 G c 5 c~, in period 2 new projects are
fmanced directly by depositors whereas in period 1 banks are active. The prospect of a
long-term investment project at the start of period 1 facilitates financial intermediation.
The absence of this prospect at the start of period 2 leads to disintermediation of new
banks.
14. Section V discusses the assumptions.
15. This implies [hat the government dces not deal with all institutions at the same time.
According to Kane (1990, p.756), the FDIC deals with one institution at a time.
16. In the cases C and D, given project failure in period 1, the conditional probability
that the project of unobserved quality is of the good type equals
q(1-pg)I[q(1-pe)f(1-q)(1-pb)] G q. So if banks are assisted in this case, banks invest at
random in a new project with unobserved quality in period 2.
17. If government intervention dces not favor random investment over searching, i.e. if
6~(u) is increasing in ~, then we have c~ ~ c~. In that case the conditions for proposition
4b) and 4c) are not satisfied.
18. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) develop a theory about a central bank's monetary
policy, in which ambiguity also plays a role. However, in their model there is ambiguity
about the central bank's (politically motivated) objective function, whereas in my model
there is ambiguity about which action the banking supervisor will take.28
19. If returns of diversification make the deposit rate a function of the number N of
investment projects, a coordination problem may arise in the competition stage of the
game. In equilibrium beliefs about the amount of funds that an individual bank will attract
have to coincide with the amount of funds the bank really attracts. This coordination
problem would be solved e.g. by the assumption that depositors deposit their funds
sequentially, observe the choices of their predecessors and know that their predecessors
know this. An ex post coordination problem may be that bank runs may occur. Deposit
insurance may be necessary.
20. However, if the government would be better informed than the market would be, this
could give rise to an incentive problem of the type studied in Boot and Thakor (1993)
(BBcT) and in Kane (1990). Kane (1990) describes political motives that explain why
"unlike a private salvor, the Resolution Trust Company (a successor of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) is saddled with the additional objective of
slowing down official recognition of the full size of FSLIC's losses." Thus, there may be
a principal-agent problem between taxpayers and their agent, the supervisor, preventing
the supervisor from managing its affairs at minimum taxpayer cost. In BBcT, uncer[ainty
about the regulator's ability to monitor the bank's assets creates a desire for the regulator
to acquire a reputation as a capable monitor, and this desire distorts his bank closure
policy.
21. The successful deviating bank's alternative option in period 2 is not to use the period
1 information, but instead to act as a new bank. It never chooses this option. In
equilibrium the new bank is indifferent between search and random investment, so by Q'
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